Introduction
This chapter focuses on the question of to what extent the Syrian Kurds or their different movements functioned as an obstacle to the democratization of the Syrian state. Did their activities hinder the development of more democratic structures in Syria? Did their (nationalist) requests initiate repressions from Arab nationalist groups or the central authority that otherwise would not have come into existence and that had repercussions for other parts of the country? Have the different Kurdish actors been at all interested in a democratization of Syria-or did they rather focus on the Kurdish issue? If so, did they at least manage to create democratic political and social structures in their own sphere of influence?
I will argue that, first of all, the Kurdish question in Syria has not been central enough and Kurdish stakeholders have not exercised sufficient influence to effectively hinder democratic developments had they arisen. Nor were the Syrian Kurds powerful enough to initiate democratic developments in the country on their own. Compared to states such as Turkey or Iraq, the number of Kurds in Syria is not only comparably low-an estimated 2 million, within a total population of around 20 million 1 -but at the same time, Syrian-Kurdish party leaders and activists have mostly not been very interested in Syria as a whole. They rather tried to secure specific "Kurdish" rights from those in power-be it Bashar al-Assad or the French High Commissioner. Moreover, too often they have not even been interested in the Kurdish parts of Syria, but followed the agenda of Kurdish parties from Turkey or Iraq.
Secondly, the Syrian-Kurdish parties and activists were also not successful in creating more participatory structures in their own sphere of influence. Their political parties are in many ways a mirror picture of the Baʿth party, and the current Kurdish administration in the northeast of the country, to which many observers mistakenly refer to as "liberated areas," reproduces the authoritarianism of the Baʿth system-under a Kurdish nationalist cover. Developments in the Kurdish areas thus will not have positive effects on other parts of Syria, but will rather strengthen anti-democratic structures and help to hinder the fall of the regime. Moreover, they will not serve to check and balance the rise of Islamist groups-at least thus far the dominating Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its militia rather provoked Islamist attacks on the Kurdish territories.
To The attitude of the Kurds living in Syrian territory toward the mandate power varied from region to region. The first segment of the Kurdish population to come into contact with the French were the Kurds from ʿ Afrin-a region that had been taken over with relative ease in 1919. The Kurdish population of Damascus likewise proved loyal to the French. The leading Kurdish families, al-Yusiv and Shamdin, were critical of Arab nationalism, which threatened their ethnic and clan-based networks. In contrast, the
